# Who decides

> Holders vote, and each added vote costs more than the one before.

Gavin Robert McGowen · interstellarblends.com. This site describes a patent application. It offers no token, security or investment.

Canonical: https://velocityprosperity.com/governance/

## The scalpel

- “a vote of one unit may accordingly cost one token, and a vote of two units may cost four tokens.”
- Claim 10 makes the cost “a square of the number of votes cast”.
- A proposal passes on a quorum with more yes votes than no. When it passes, the tokens locked on the yes side are consumed and the no side’s refunded; when it fails, both sides are refunded.
- The fund pays out only if its balance “would remain at or above a reserve floor”.

## In plain words

Holders vote on changes. Each added vote on a ballot costs more than the one before, which, in the specification’s words, “may reduce a marginal influence gained by a single token holder”.

Votes cast and their token cost

| Votes | Tokens | Scale | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 |  | Specification |
| 2 | 4 |  | Specification |
| 3 | 9 |  | Claim 10 |
| 4 | 16 |  | Claim 10 |
| 5 | 25 |  | Claim 10 |
| 10 | 100 |  | Claim 10 |

> “the nonlinear function is equal to a square of the number of votes cast in the vote; the governance subsystem is configured to determine that the proposal has passed responsive to a participation rate meeting or exceeding a governance quorum and a total number of yes votes exceeding a total number of no votes; and”
> “As an illustrative, non-limiting example, a vote of one unit may accordingly cost one token, and a vote of two units may cost four tokens.”
> “Determining a token cost as a nonlinear function of a number of votes cast may reduce a marginal influence gained by a single token holder casting an increasing number of votes on a recorded proposal.”
> — Claim 10 · Specification, description of FIG. 6

## When a proposal passes

> “the nonlinear function is equal to a square of the number of votes cast in the vote; the governance subsystem is configured to determine that the proposal has passed responsive to a participation rate meeting or exceeding a governance quorum and a total number of yes votes exceeding a total number of no votes; and”
> — Claim 10

## What happens to the tokens

> “consume a locked token amount corresponding to votes cast on a side of the proposal matching an outcome of the proposal, responsive to the proposal passing, and”
> “refund a locked token amount corresponding to votes cast on an opposing side of the proposal.”
> “DAO governance module 300 may refund a locked token amount corresponding to a vote cast on each side of a rejected proposal.”
> — Claim 10 · Specification, description of FIG. 6

## The fund keeps a floor

> “determine, for a proposed disbursement from the treasury, whether a balance of the treasury after the proposed disbursement would remain at or above a reserve floor, and”
> “the reserve floor is calculated from an average disbursement from the treasury over a trailing plurality of ledger intervals, and”
> — Claims 11 and 12

The question

## How are decisions made in VP2.0?

By quadratic voting: casting a number of votes costs that number squared in tokens (claim 10); a proposal passes on a quorum with more yes votes than no; and the fund pays out only if its balance after the payment would stay at or above a reserve floor (claims 11 and 12).

**The sources in full every quotation on this page, where it stands**

> “the nonlinear function is equal to a square of the number of votes cast in the vote; the governance subsystem is configured to determine that the proposal has passed responsive to a participation rate meeting or exceeding a governance quorum and a total number of yes votes exceeding a total number of no votes; and”
> — VP2.0 · Claim 10

> “As an illustrative, non-limiting example, a vote of one unit may accordingly cost one token, and a vote of two units may cost four tokens.”
> — VP2.0 specification

> “consume a locked token amount corresponding to votes cast on a side of the proposal matching an outcome of the proposal, responsive to the proposal passing, and”
> — VP2.0 · Claim 10

> “refund a locked token amount corresponding to votes cast on an opposing side of the proposal.”
> — VP2.0 · Claim 10

> “DAO governance module 300 may refund a locked token amount corresponding to a vote cast on each side of a rejected proposal.”
> — VP2.0 specification

> “determine, for a proposed disbursement from the treasury, whether a balance of the treasury after the proposed disbursement would remain at or above a reserve floor, and”
> — VP2.0 · Claim 11

> “Determining a token cost as a nonlinear function of a number of votes cast may reduce a marginal influence gained by a single token holder casting an increasing number of votes on a recorded proposal.”
> — VP2.0 specification

> “the reserve floor is calculated from an average disbursement from the treasury over a trailing plurality of ledger intervals, and”
> — VP2.0 · Claim 12